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Methodological naturalism, the exclusion of the supernatural from the natural sciences, has drawn  
critique from both proponents of Intelligent Design a d some philosophical naturalists who argue 
that the methods of science can also be used to evaluate supernatural claims. One principal 
objection to methodological naturalism has been what I c ll the truth seeking objection. In this 
article I develop an understanding of methodological naturalism capable of answering the truth 
seeking objection. I further also argue that methodol gical naturalism as a convention of science 
can be best defended by abandoning scientism. In this way methodological naturalism can be 




Methodological naturalism as a ground rule of science has been one of the primary arguments 
against Intelligent Design (ID) and creationism. For example, in the 1987 trial in the U.S. over the 
teaching of creationism, philosopher Michael Ruse referred to methodological naturalism to 
criticize the efforts of creationists to portray creationism and evolution as competing scientific 
theories. Ruse claimed that no theory that appeals to supernatural entities can possibly be science, 
already by definition: “any reliance on a supernatural force, a Creator intervening in a natural 
world by supernatural process, is necessarily not science.”1  In the verdict, five main criteria of 
science were defined, following Ruse: (1) Science is guided by natural law, (2) it explains by 
reference to natural law, (3) it is testable against the empirical world, (4) its conclusions are 
tentative, and (5) it is falsifiable.  (Ruse 2009, 272; see further Pennock & Ruse ed. 2009; Pennock 
2011.) In 2005, in the Kitzmiller trial over the teaching of Intelligent Design in public schools, Judge 
                                                          
1 In this article I will use the terms “natural” and “supernatural” as they are commonly used in the discussion over 
methodological naturalism. However, it is important to note that many theologians would object to the us  of the term 
“supernatural”. For example, Conor Cunningham (2010, 177) argues that we might rather call God natural, and nature 
supernatural. On the origin of distinction between the natural and the supernatural, see Bartlett 2008. 
John E. Jones similarly ruled that ID “violates the centuries-old ground rules of science by 
invoking and permitting supernatural causation.” (Jones 2005, 64) Sometimes critics of ID have 
stated the scientific restriction of the supernatural very strongly: “even if all the data point to an 
intelligent designer, such an hypothesis is excluded from science because it is not naturalistic. Of 
course the scientist, as an individual, is free to embrace a reality that transcends naturalism.” 
(Todd 1999) On this received understanding, science is simply by definition a search for natural 
explanations. Science is concerned with understanding the natural causal structure of the cosmos, 
and its methods are unsuited for discussing theological and philosophical questions, such as 
whether nature is ultimately purposeful or not. 
However, methodological naturalism as an argument against ID has also recently faced critique. 
Unsurprisingly, the critique of methodological naturalism is common feature of the ID 
movement’s argumentation. (Beckwith 2003) For its defenders, ID is revolutionary new science, 
and its opposition is merely ideological. The conclusion that nature is designed is argued to be the 
clear result of the cumulative efforts of the various natural sciences, and proponents of ID believe 
this conclusion to be ‘so unambiguous and so significant that it must be ranked as one of the 
greatest achievements in the history of science’. (Behe 2006, 232-233) The critique of 
methodological naturalism regarding the study of life's history predates the ID movement (see e.g. 
Thaxton, Bradley & Olson 1984, pp. 202–214). The critique of methodological naturalism made by 
later ID proponents traces back to Phillip E. Johnson, the early visionary of the ID movement. 
According to his critique, methodological naturalism hinders the capacity of science to find out 
truths and avoid false theories about nature. Johnson argued already in his Darwin on Trial that 
defenders of naturalism “enforce rules of procedure that preclude opposing points of view.” (Johnson 
1993, 118) By allowing only natural explanations within science, the possibility that biological life 
has actually been created supernaturally has been excluded from science already before the 
consideration of evidence, Johnson argues. He claims that this protects naturalism from 
falsification and critique, and compromises science as a search for true theories. The same objection 
to methodological naturalism has also been defended in various ways by thinkers outside the ID 
movement, such as Alvin Plantinga (1997) and Bradley Monton (2009). I call this the truth seeking 
objection to methodological naturalism. Johnson and the ID movement are confident that if the 
evidence were discussed openly, without prejudging the conclusion due to methodological 
naturalism, then ID´s claims about nature would be vindicated. 
 
More surprisingly, methodological naturalism has also faced critique from some thinkers who do 
not think there is any plausibility to ID's arguments regarding the designedness of life. The 
critique concerns the specific understanding of methodological naturalism as a principle barring 
the consideration of supernatural hypotheses. In their article “How Not to Attack Intelligent 
Design Creationism” (2010) philosophers Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke and Johan Braeckman 
argue that this kind of intrinsic methodological naturalism – where consideration of the 
supernatural is thought to be excluded already based on the definition and basic methodological 
assumptions of the natural sciences – is flawed, and none of the reasons for excluding the 
supernatural from science already in principle work. They further argue in their article “Grist to 
the Mill of Anti-Evolutionism: The Failed Strategy of Ruling the Supernatural Out of Science by 
Philosophical Fiat” that methodological naturalism of this type invites the criticism that science is 
biased against design, since it appears to exclude supernatural explanations without consideration. 
(Boudry, Blancke & Braeckman 2012) Instead, they present a pragmatic defense of methodological 
naturalism: the restriction of science to the natural should be done provisionally and based on the 
previous failure of supernatural explanations and the success of naturalistic explanations. This 
means that science should in principle be open also to supernatural explanations and the ID 
proponent´s arguments; they are rejected only because of their failure, not because the idea of 
design is itself outside the bounds of the natural sciences.  
 
Nevertheless, this kind of expansion of the understanding of methodological naturalism is not 
easy for all to accept. Is it truly so that supernaturalistic personal explanations could in principle be 
a part of the natural sciences? Within pragmatic methodological naturalism, the rejection of 
supernatural explanations from the natural sciences is based on the failure of such explanations in 
all instances in history. This defense of methodological naturalism should be compelling 
particularly for philosophical naturalists, who do not see any good reason to believe in a Creator 
God, and who thus think there is good reason to believe that all of reality is amenable to scientific 
study in so far as it can be studied at all. (Ritchie 2008; see further Williams & Robinson 2014) 
However, as I will argue below, it does not fit the original theistic context of the development of 
methodological naturalism, because the developers of methodological naturalism believed in the 
goodness of at least some theistic explanations.  
 
In the contemporary situation there still also exist many people who think that supernatural (or 
theistic) explanations can sometimes be good, without thinking that these explanations should 
therefore be considered to be a part of science. Rather, the arguments for and against the existence 
of God are defended as philosophical arguments, not as part of the natural sciences. Richard 
Swinburne, for example, argues that natural theology (the attempt to support belief in God with 
some publicly available evidence) is based on phenomena which are either “too big” or “too odd” 
for science, such as the origin of the natural laws. (Swinburne 2004, 74-75; see further Craig & 
Moreland 2012 and Manning, Brooke & Watts (eds.) 2013).2 Though religious belief in God is not 
usually adopted merely as an explanation, it does for many also have an explanatory dimension. 
(Vainio 2010, McGrath 2016). For anyone accepting even some supernatural explanations as 
probably true, the idea of the general failure of supernatural explanations cannot function as the 
grounding of methodological naturalism within science. So, it seems to me that people who agree 
with Swinburne or other natural theologians must seek some other grounds for methodological 
naturalism, and some other way of defending methodological naturalism against the truth seeking 
objection. Theists will be much more attracted to traditional intrinsic methodological naturalism, 
which allows the acceptance of methodological naturalism as a convention of the natural sciences, 
while leaving us “free to embrace a reality that transcends naturalism” (Todd 1999) outside the 
natural sciences. That is, theists are more apt to be interested in methodological naturalism 
without scientism, the belief that science is our only reliable guide to reality. (Stenmark 2001; 
Williams & Robinson, ed. 2014) It seems prudent to study whether this kind of traditional 
methodological naturalism can withstand the critique proponents of Intelligent Design have 
launched against it, and on what conditions methodological naturalism can indeed be a reasonable 
ground rule of the natural sciences. 
 
The purpose of this article is to develop the truth seeking objection against methodological 
naturalism further and to analyze how methodological naturalism can be formulated to respond to 
this objection. To that end, I will begin by analyzing the critique of methodological naturalism 
within the ID movement, concentrating particularly on the truth seeking objection. I will then 
                                                          
2 For critical evaluations of theistic explanations, see Mackie 1982, Dawes 2009 and Philipse 2012. For analysis of the 
related question of the “God of the Gaps”, see Kojonen 2016b. 
develop a response to the truth seeking objection, using insights from both the philosophy of 
science and from the academic discussion regarding the relationship of theology and the natural 
sciences.  
 
The Critique of Methodological Naturalism in the Intelligent Design 
Debate 
 
As Boudry, Blancke and Braeckman (2010, 228) note, the basic critique of methodological naturalism 
predates the contemporary Intelligent Design movement, and was already presented by creationists 
like Duane Gish, who wrote that the “reason that most scientists accept the theory of evolution is 
that most scientists are unbelievers, and unbelieving, materialistic men are forced to accept a 
materialistic, naturalistic explanation for the origin of all living things.” (Gish 1973, 24) Nevertheless, 
the critique of methodological naturalism is much more pronounced in the ID movement´s 
argumentation. Johnson´s key argument, first stated in his “Darwin on Trial” (1993[1991]) was that 
in some cases, particularly in the case of evolutionary biology, the evidential standards of science 
have been subverted by methodological naturalism. (Ratzsch 2002) Johnson argued that if we limit 
the scope of our search for explanations a priori, then it may well be that we end up setting our 
search parameters in such a way that the correct explanation is not even considered. According to 
Johnson, this is just what has happened with Darwinian evolutionary theory, which he claims is 
only weakly supported by the evidence. According to Johnson, evolutionary theory can only be 
called the best scientific explanation of the origin of the species because design is ruled out a priori. 
If Darwinism was not protected by such a philosophical assumption, then it would quickly crumble. 
(Johnson 1993, chapter 9)  
 
While Johnson’s early argumentation in Darwin on Trial critiqued the way methodological 
naturalism bars supernatural design from science (Johnson 1993, chapter 9), later ID writings have 
emphasized that design can be detected without knowing anything about whether the designer is 
supernatural or not, and without reliance on prior religious beliefs. (Luskin 2008) Thus the design 
argument in biology is argued to be analogous to forensic science, archeology and the SETI-project, 
where the actions of intelligent designers may be detected without referencing the supernatural. 
Critics of ID argue, however, that ID´s designer is most plausibly identified as supernatural, since 
this designer is also argued to be responsible for things like the fine-tuning of the laws of nature. 
(Russell 2005, Sober 2007) Indeed, while proponents of ID argue that identifying the designer as 
supernatural is a separate logical step beyond the design argument, the most prominent defenders 
of ID such as Johnson, Michael J. Behe (2006, 251), William A. Dembski (2004, chapter 25) and 
Stephen C. Meyer (2009, 428-430) all believe that the designer is most plausibly the Triune Christian 
God. (See further Kojonen 2016a, chapter 6) 
 
This explains why critics of ID believe that ID violates methodological naturalism as a restriction 
against supernatural explanations in science. However, why do proponents of ID believe that ID 
violates methodological naturalism? The answer seems to be that as proponents of ID nowadays 
adopt a somewhat different definition of methodological naturalism than Johnson. For instance, 
Meyer argues that “Methodological naturalism asserts that to qualify as scientific, a theory must 
explain all phenomena by reference to purely material—that is, non-intelligent—causes.” (2009, 
434) As Kathryn Applegate (2013, 40) notes, here methodological naturalism is understood to bar 
not just supernatural designers, but also all finite intelligent designers. Sometimes later ID texts 
indeed agree with methodological naturalists in arguing that supernatural factors should be 
barred from science. Thus William Dembski and Jonathan Wells assert in the ID textbook The 
Design of Life that “supernatural explanations invoke miracles and therefore are not properly part 
of science. Explanations that call on intelligent causes require no miracles but cannot be reduced to 
materialistic explanations.” (2008, 13-14) Dembski´s position is that ID´s design argument as such 
does not take a stance of whether the designer is supernatural or non-supernatural. However, even 
if the only possibility is that the designer is “non-embodied” (which sounds supernatural) 
Dembski still argues that this kind of implication alone should not make the design argument 
unscientific. (2004, 191; 2002, pp. 347–353; similarly Behe 1998, 34-35) The critique of 
methodological naturalism remains a distinctive emphasis of ID´s argumentation, repeated in all 
major defenses of ID. 
The standard definition of methodological naturalism does not include a ban on all design-based 
explanations, just supernatural ones. However, the interpretation that methodological naturalism 
also rules out non-supernatural intelligent causes from the natural sciences is not unreasonable 
when compared to the definition of science in the 1987 creationism trial. Design-based 
explanations are fundamentally different from law-based explanations. The testing of personal 
explanations by scientific experiments seems challenging, because it is much more difficult to 
generate precise testable predictions from a hypothesis of design, though it may be possible in 
some cases. As Del Ratzsch notes, “design theories are, ultimately, theories involving agency. And, 
with respect to agents, theories and explanations often must trail data. We are often in positions of 
utter inability to predict specific human actions, but such actions once observed may be readily 
and quite legitimately explainable.” (Ratzsch 2001, 117) Personal explanations are in many ways 
quite different from explanations that are usually considered in the methodologically naturalistic 
natural sciences, though they may be used in other sciences, such as psychology, sociology, 
forensic science, archeology and SETI. (Swinburne 2004, chapter 2). This provides some 
justification for the idea that personal explanations are also excluded from the natural sciences. So, 
both critics and defenders of ID have their separate justifications for the idea that methodological 
naturalism bars the consideration of design within natural science. 
In contrast to methodological naturalism, Johnson proposed an alternative "theistic realist" 
framework for science. This theistic realism would be an open investigation of nature, allowing that 
God has created nature in an orderly fashion to be studied scientifically. In natural history, God 
could have used evolutionary mechanisms, or he could have acted miraculously. Johnson has a 
strong theological preference for any option which allows us to have evidence of divine action in 
history. However, neither evolution nor creationism is to be barred from science on a priori grounds 
(as Johnson believes is done in methodological naturalism), but only on the basis of empirical 
investigation. (Johnson 1993, chapter 9; Johnson 1995, appendix)3 
 
Developing the Truth Seeking Objection 
 
The basic point of the truth seeking objection can also be formulated without the theological 
framework which assumes that God is free to create in any way. Methodologically naturalistic 
science seeks only natural causes to explain for natural history. None of its theories about natural 
history can include any reference to a supernatural creator or purposes behind life. But let us 
                                                          
3 Johnson´s theistic realism is related to the idea of theistic science, according to which Christian believers should 
conduct science from the standpoint of assuming that God exists, taking into account all that they believe as Christians. 
On this discussion see Ratzsch 2004 and Labody 2015 (defending theistic science) as well as Stenmark 2004, chapters 8 
and 9 (defending the neutrality of science). 
suppose that the natural history is in actual fact explained by the actions of a supernatural Creator, 
working beyond the laws of nature to affect the world. Suppose further that natural processes would 
have actually been incapable of producing the various forms of life we see around us. But even 
supposing that this is factually the case and that we have plenty of evidence to confirm it, 
methodologically naturalistic science could never discover these essential truths about the history 
of life. Rather, for methodologically naturalistic science, the best explanation of the origin of life 
would even in this case be that the various forms of life emerged as the result of some kind of 
evolutionary processes which we do not yet understand. In such a world, using methodologically 
naturalistic natural science as our guide to reality would lead us to form highly erroneous beliefs. 
This would be counter to the usual pursuit of testability and reliability in science. Or so the argument 
goes.4 
 
Below, I have outlined the argument with premises: 
 
1. Science aims at generating theories and models that are as close to true as possible about the 
world.5 
2. The methodology of science should be chosen in such a way as to make attaining this goal as 
likely as possible. 
3. If the true explanation of natural history is not naturalistic, then methodological naturalism 
would hinder science from attaining its goal of finding true explanations. 
4. It is in principle a credible possibility that the true explanation of natural history is not 
naturalistic, but rather supernatural. 
5. Therefore, methodological naturalism might hinder science from finding out the truth about 
natural history. 
6. Therefore, methodological naturalism conflicts with the goals of science.  
7. Therefore, methodological naturalism should be abandoned. 
 
One way to critique the argument would be to focus on premise 4: that supernatural creation or 
intelligent design is a credible possibility that should be taken into account when considering what 
the true explanation is. It might be argued that there are lots of hypotheses that we do not take into 
                                                          
4  Monton (2013) puts the point as follows: “If scienc  really is committed to methodological naturalism, then it 
automatically follows that the aim of science is not generating true theories. Instead, the aim of science would be 
something like: generating the best theories that can be formulated subject to the restriction that those theories are 
naturalistic.” 
5 I am assuming a critical realist understanding of the nature of science here. This is the assumed philosophy of most 
working scientists, but not uncontroversial in the philosophy of science. (See Niiniluoto 2002 & McGrath 2002 for 
more on this discussion.) If we adopt a different, a tirealist understanding of the goals of scientific heories, then the 
truth seeking objection does not work, at least withou  heavy modification.  
account in natural science. For example, natural scientists do not usually have to consider the 
possibility that we are actually living inside the Matrix. There is no need to require the sciences to 
take into account possibilities that cannot be investigated and for which we do not (or in some cases 
even cannot) have evidence.  
 
Indeed there are philosophical and theological worldviews in which premise 4 does not have much 
credibility. These may even be dominant in parts of contemporary Western culture: as Charles 
Taylor has noted in his often quoted analysis of secularism, for many the idea of God acting in the 
world has become difficult to conceive of as a plausible possibility. (Taylor 2005, 141) However, there 
are also cultures in which premise 4 is at least credible enough to deserve consideration. Of course, 
the idea that life is created is also part of the religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. 
It is true that God is also thought to work through secondary causes, so that there is no necessity to 
suppose supernatural action within natural history. But the supernatural nature of creation has also 
been a widely accepted view in these traditions, so it does seem like a theologically plausible 
possibility without further evidence. 6 One problem with all of this is that if we rely on these ideas 
to ground or deny methodological naturalism, we need to introduce a lot of theological background 
assumptions to ground the practices of the natural sciences.  
 
There may also be reason to take the possibility of supernatural design seriously for those outside 
religious traditions. Both critics and defenders of creationism and ID usually agree that biological 
order bears the appearance of having been designed for a purpose. The intuitive credibility of design 
as an explanation is a commonly stated background assumption of the ID movement. Behe argues 
that “the overwhelming appearance of design strongly affects the burden of proof: in the presence of manifest 
design, the onus of proof is on the one who denies the plain evidence of his eyes.” (2006, 265) In recent 
decades, the idea that humans intuitively see nature as designed has received support from research 
in the cognitive science of religion. Teleological explanations are argued to be natural to us humans 
in the sense that they accord with our natural cognitive tendencies, and so are easy for us to accept. 
Some even argue that children are “intuitive theists”. Even adults appear to have the same intuitive 
tendency to explain things by reference to purposes. (Kelemen 2004; see further De Cruz & De Smedt 
                                                          
6 It is possible to argue that while this is a serious possibility (and so premise 4 is credible), it is not a scientific 
hypothesis, but a theological and philosophical idea which is not in competition with scientific explanations such as 
evolution. I will come back to this below. 
2015) As Ratzsch and Koperski (2015) put the point, “design thinking may be natural to our sorts of 
intellects”. As stated, even many critics of the design argument usually also see it as intuitively 
plausible.7 
 
Based on the commonality of this kind of experience of nature, it seems that design is indeed an 
explanation of nature that is initially appealing to many, perhaps to most humans. It therefore seems 
possible to argue that it would be strange to completely ignore such an intuitive plausible 
explanation when investigating the history of life. So, it seems to me that the truth seeking objection 
deserves to be taken seriously. We need to show how methodological naturalism does not actually 
lead away from the truth.  
 
A common way to answer the ID movement´s critique of methodological naturalism theologically 
has been to make the distinction between methodological and metaphysical naturalism. (Murphy 
1993, Pennock 1999). This distinction was already present in what appears to be the first article using 
term “methodological naturalism.”8 In his article “Naturalism in the natural sciences” (1986), 
Wheaton College philosopher Paul de Vries introduced the term “methodological naturalism” to 
describe the convention that the natural sciences are limited to the study of natural causes and 
natural laws, and that no references to supernatural factors should be made within science. De Vries 
argued that methodological naturalism is distinct from metaphysical naturalism which is a 
philosophical belief that nothing supernatural (such as God, gods, spirits or souls) exists. De Vries´ 
point was that it is both possible and reasonable to hold to methodological naturalism within the 
natural sciences without believing in metaphysical naturalism.9 
                                                          
7 Here´s a quote illustrating this from David Hume´s "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion", spoken in part III by the 
character Cleanthes: 
 
“Consider, anatomize the eye; survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling, if 
the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation. The most 
obvious conclusion, surely, is in favour of design; a d it requires time, reflection, and study, to summon up 
those frivolous, though abstruse objections, which can support Infidelity. Who can behold the male and
female of each species, the correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions, and whole course of 
life before and after generation, but must be sensible, that the propagation of the species is intended by 
Nature? Millions and millions of such instances present themselves through every part of the universe; and 
no language can convey a more intelligible irresistible meaning, than the curious adjustment of final causes. 
To what degree, therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such natural and such 
convincing arguments?” 
8 See Numbers 2003 for the history. 
9 De Vries 1986. Many different motivations for strong methodological naturalism have been posited. ID proponents 
Dembski and Witt (2010, 23-24) argue that the main motivation of methodological naturalism is atheism: “Only about 
one in ten Americans is an out-and-out atheist, but atheists have managed to extend their influence by selling religious 
 
Del Ratzsch (2002) argues that whether or not Johnson has adequately understood the difference 
between methodological and metaphysical naturalism, the core of his critique stands: “If (perhaps 
for overwhelmingly good reasons) science is restricted (even just methodologically) to ‘natural’ 
explanatory and theoretical resources, then if there is a supernatural realm which does impinge 
upon the structure and/or operation of the ‘natural’ realm, then the world-picture generated by even 
the best science will unavoidably be either incomplete or else wrong on some points.” Johnson´s 
argument is that methodologically naturalistic science will reliably lead to true beliefs about the 
history of life only if that history actually is purely naturalistic. But there is no a priori way to know 
that the history of life is truly naturalistic; it is in principle possible that the history of life actually 
includes a supernatural creation event or several such events. This possibility needs to be eliminated 
only after considering the evidence. Johnson´s claim is that methodologically naturalistic science 
cannot consider the evidence impartially, since it cannot consider any non-naturalistic possibilities. 
The distinction between methodological and metaphysical naturalism indeed does not seem to affect 
this point. 
 
Provisional Methodological Naturalism as a Response to the Truth 
Seeking Objection 
 
One way of responding to the truth seeking objection would be to adopt the pragmatic, 
provisional understanding of methodological naturalism stated by Boudry, Blancke and 
Braeckman (2010). Under this understanding of methodological naturalism, supernatural design 
can in principle be considered as an explanation within the natural sciences. The rejection of 
design is then based on the evidence, not on any a priori considerations. This basic position has 
also been stated by others: For example, Phillip Kitcher (2007) argues that ID does qualify as 
science, and that even methodologically naturalistic science can be open to evidence of design. 
                                                          
people a related idea called methodological materialism.” (Similarly Bartlett & Holloway (eds.), forthcoming) Prior 
belief in metaphysical naturalism would indeed be on possible way of grounding methodological naturalism. If it 
seems likely that nothing supernatural exists, thenis also makes it reasonable not to refer to supernatural entities 
within the natural sciences. However, as noted, to make methodological naturalism appealing to people th r than those 
who are already committed to philosophical naturalism, some other grounds would be needed. Also, as I note in the 
main text, methodological naturalism initially did not emerge as an atheistic idea, so it seems reasonable to think that its 
initial main motivation must have been compatible with theism. 
However, he goes on to argue that ID is bad 18th century science which has been superseded and 
refuted by the developments of science after that.  Niall Shanks similarly argues that “the 
methodological naturalist will not simply rule hypotheses about supernatural causes out of court”, 
but rather based on the failure of supernaturalistic arguments. (2004, 141-142; similarly Sarkar 
2011)10 
 
In practice those professing the openness of the natural sciences to design-based explanations may 
still adopt criteria for evaluating explanations which make design based explanations in practice 
very difficult to defend. For example, Dawkins begins his book the Blind Watchmaker by affirming 
that intelligent design is an intuitively very plausible explanation for biological complexity. 
(Dawkins 1991, chapter 1) In his later book The God Delusion, Dawkins even calls God a “scientific 
hypothesis” (2006, chapter 1), one that the progress of science has made unnecessary by providing 
better explanations. However, on closer examination, it is clear that for Dawkins, the rules of 
rationality themselves mitigate against the design argument and belief in God. At the end of the 
Blind Watchmaker (chapter 6) Dawkins considers the question of how the origin of life should be 
explained, and argues on philosophical grounds that even random chance is a better explanation 
for the origin of life than supernatural design. This is because, for Dawkins, the purpose of 
explanation is to understand the complex by referring to something less complex. The God 
hypothesis, according to Dawkins, postulates a very complex Creator to explain the complexity of 
the biological world and the order of the universe. Thus Dawkins (2006, chapter 4) argues that the 
God hypothesis doesn’t really explain complexity, but only introduces more complexity. 
 
                                                          
10 This type of rejection of a priori arguments against ID is also implicit in some accounts in which the rise of 
Darwinian evolutionary theory is seen as the central reason why biological design arguments can now be rejected. For 
example, cosmologist Sean M. Carroll (2003, 631) writes that “A few centuries ago, for example, it would have been 
completely reasonable to observe the complexity and subtlety exhibited in the workings of biological creatures, and 
conclude that such intricacy could not possibly have risen by chance, but must instead be attributed to the plan of the 
Creator. The advent of Darwin’s theory of evolution, featuring descent with modification and natural selection, 
provided a mechanism by which such apparently improbable configurations could have arisen via innumerabl  gradual 
changes.” This implies that without Darwinian evolutionary biology, design would still be the best explanation for 
biological order. This assumes that design possesse at l ast some rationality as an explanation and cnot be dismissed 
on a priori grounds, just by invoking the definition f science. In my understanding, proponents of ID would welcome 
this kind of understanding of methodological naturalism, but would just differ on the state of the evidence. There has 
been some debate whether Hume or Darwin was more important in refuting biological design arguments. Historically, 
biological design arguments continued to be defended long after Hume, and indeed Paley’s Natural Theology was 
written only after Hume. Gregory Dawes (2007) argues that Darwin is indeed necessary, as Carroll says. Walhberg 
(2012) goes further and argues that biological design arguments are even compatible with Darwinian evolutionary 
biology.  
Dawkins´argument has been subjected to extensive and good critique. (E.g. Orr 2007, Plantinga 
2007, Glass 2012). But here my point is simply that on Dawkins´philosophy of explanations, the 
playing field is not really open to theistic or design-based explanations. Rather, the superiority of 
non-theistic explanations is already built into the premises of his system of thought. This is not 
really moderate methodological naturalism, since it is not actually open to other than naturalistic 
explanations.  This kind of reasoning is vulnerable to the truth-seeking objection against 
methodological naturalism, so defending moderate methodological naturalism requires changing 
the ground rules of science so that they do not include a built-in preference for natural 
explanations. This means expanding the traditional understanding of “natural science.”  
 
However, it may be desirable to retain science as an enterprise focused just on natural 
explanations, so that its basic features are more easily defined and the difference between personal 
explanations and natural science is maintained. This would allow the natural sciences to focus on 
those explanations which are “scientifically tractable” (Collins 2006), leaving other kinds of 
explanations for other disciplines.11 Some observers of the ID debate have criticized the actual 
criteria of demarcation used to rule the supernatural outside the natural sciences. This discussion 
was begun by philosopher of science Larry Laudan already after the McLean v. Arkansas - 
creationism trial (see Pennock & Ruse ed. 2009). One problem is also that the core of theories can 
seldom be falsified directly: theories can often be amended to explain anomalies, and tests require 
the addition of auxiliary hypotheses to the theory. Perhaps creationism and ID could also be 
formulated to be testable at least to some extent. (Boudry, Blancke & Braeckman 2010; Ratzsch 
2001, chapters 7-9; Koperski 2008) The problem of demarcating between science and pseudoscience 
is a difficult one, and there is “almost complete disagreement on the general criteria” by which this 
demarcation is to be done. (Hansson 2015) 12 Nevertheless, though vagueness in definitions can 
often be unavoidable, we can typically operate well in spite of it (van Deemter 2010). We can 
usually quite easily tell if a problem is better studied through the methods of sociology than 
through the methods of chemistry, for example. Perhaps there might be similar reasons for 
                                                          
11 For the contrary perspective that design-based explanations are in all relevant respects similar to natural scientific 
explanations, see Meyer 1999. 
12 Nagasawa (2011, 97-101) also notes that it is for ID critics a much easier strategy to argue that Intelligent Design has 
not been established as good science, than to arguethat it could not even in principle be scientific. See Nagasawa (2011, 
97-101). 
thinking that the natural sciences should be methodologically naturalistic, and putative 
supernatural explanations should be considered elsewhere. 
 
Defending Intrinsic, Provisional Methodological Naturalism 
 
I will now argue that looking at the original context for the development of methodological 
naturalism makes the truth seeking objection much less persuasive. Historians Ronald C. Numbers 
(2003) and Robert C. Bishop (2013) trace the origins of methodological naturalism to the Christian 
Middle Ages. Because Christians believed in a God who had created a rational universe, they also 
believed that the causal structure of that universe could be understood through studying it. The 
aim of the natural sciences from the scientific revolution onwards was simply to focus on studying 
the inner workings of and mechanisms of God´s creation, rather than the purposes of God. 
Interestingly, typically Christian natural philosophers and early modern scientists affirmed the 
reality of even miraculous divine action. Thus their methodological naturalism, such as it was, was 
certainly not based on the general failure of supernatural or theistic explanations in all instances. 
Rather, methodological naturalism was based on pragmatic reasons. By focusing on natural 
explanations, scientific methods could be formulated to study them as accurately as possible. As 
Bishop (2013, 13) notes: “for these natural philosophers, MN [methodological naturalism] was a 
commitment to particular methods of inquiry for a particular limited purpose: To understand the 
nature of the matter, forces, and laws that God had made.” 
 
Contemporary theistic defenders of methodological naturalism also typically understand 
methodological naturalism in the same way as not excluding theistic explanations completely. In the 
theology and science community, the natural sciences, the humanities, as well as theology and 
philosophy are understood to each have their own domain. Each science proceeds by its own 
method to study those questions which its methods are best suited for analyzing. The proper 
methods of investigation are based on our understanding of the ontology of what is being studied. 
There can be overlap and connections between the different fields, but by and large each science 
does its own thing. (Russell 2008; see also Peacocke 1993, 217 Alister E. McGrath has used Roy 
Bhaskar´s (1998) concept of a “stratified reality” to argue that studying the complexity of reality 
requires several different levels of explanation. (McGrath 2002; McGrath 2016) Theistic explanations 
are accepted within these models. For example, Christian believers can believe that God is the proper 
explanation for the fine-tuning of the laws of nature (Collins 2012; Leslie 1989). However, theistic 
explanation is typically understood to work on a different level and in a different manner than 
explanations in the natural sciences. For example, John F. Haught (2008, 35) argues that theology 
should have “the role of ultimate explanation in an extended hierarchy of explanations that includes, and 
does not in any way compete with, scientific accounts.” Accordingly, the critique of the “God of the gaps” 
is also influential in the discussion over theology and the natural sciences. It is argued that we should 
not insert divine action into gaps of scientific knowledge, but let theological explanation remain on 
the level of ultimate explanation. (See further Kojonen 2016b) 
 
Although this basic understanding of the relationship of theology and the natural sciences may help 
promote mutual understanding between disciplines, one might still press the truth seeking objection 
against it. Yes, the idea that God acts through secondary causes is a commonplace in traditional 
Christian theology. Nevertheless, the traditional view also includes the possibility of miracles. 
Thomas Aquinas did argue that God acts through secondary causes, but he did also believe that “by 
no other means can it better be made manifest that all nature is subject to the divine will, than by the 
fact that He sometimes works independently of the order of nature.” (Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. 
3, ch. 99).13 So, one might argue that there is no way to be sure a priori that God acts only through 
secondary causes in the history of life, and that this history thus did not include any supernatural 
creative acts.  As Plantinga (1997, 16) writes, “Obviously we have no guarantee that God has done 
everything by way of employing secondary causes, or in such a way as to encourage further scientific 
inquiry, or for our convenience as scientists, or for the benefit of the NSF.” 
 
The same basic idea of the freedom of God also underlies Johnson´s (1995) theistic realism. Johnson’s 
emphasis on the independence of God from the world and his ability to create any sort of world is 
reminiscent of the medieval debates on the logic of “possible worlds”. Pierre Duhem dates the 
beginning of the scientific revolution at March 7, 1277, when a set of theses of Aristotelian physics 
was condemned as wrongfully imposing limits on God’s omnipotence. Duhem argued that this lead 
to the rise of empirical science, because now Christians could not discover how God had created the 
world based just on philosophical first principles, but had to rely on empirical observations and 
                                                          
13 Translation from Aquinas (1997, 197). On Aquinas’ position, see Silva (2014, 13-14) and Sollereder (2015).  
experiments. (Koons 2003, 80.) The truth-seeking critique of methodological naturalism seeks to 
apply this same reasoning also to methodological naturalism. Plantinga (1997, 16) argues the point 
as follows: “We have no good grounds for insisting that God must do things one specific way; so far 
as we can see, he is free to do things in many different ways. So perhaps he did create human life 
specially; or perhaps she has done other things specially. We can't properly rule this out in advance 
by way of appeal to speculative theology; we should look and see.”14 
 
I agree with Plantinga and Johnson that we do not have very strong theological grounds for 
assuming (before the evaluation of the empirical evidence) that God has not acted miraculously in 
the history of life. Nevertheless, I would argue that based on the aforementioned understanding of 
the relationship of the different disciplines, it is possible to defend intrinsic methodological 
naturalism against the truth seeking objection. But this can only be done if we reject the basic 
assumption that it is the job of the natural sciences to seek the truth about everything. The truth 
seeking objection assumes that science is our guide to reality, but theistic defenders of 
methodological naturalism have argued from the beginning that there is also truth outside of the 
natural sciences. The natural sciences are assumed to study only a part of reality, particularly that 
part which can be understood by reference to purely natural laws and mechanisms. Philosopher 
Hans Halvorson (2014) thus argues in his defense of methodological naturalism that the truth 
seeking objection makes an “unwarranted jump from the fact that science is trying to discover 
truths, to the claim that science is trying to discover all sorts of truths. But some people, in 
particular theists, might think that some truths aren’t amenable to scientific investigation.” If we 
recognize that science is not the only way to know, then there is no reason why methodological 
naturalism should necessarily lead us astray. Rather, this account allows us to recognize when we 
encounter phenomena which are not amenable to methodologically naturalistic science. When we 
                                                          
14 Some have argued that the value of the regularity of he cosmos makes it unlikely that God would act miraculously in 
nature without good reason. (See e.g. McDonald & Tro, forthcoming). Thus one could argue that if there is no good 
reason to expect that God would have acted miraculously within natural history, then the Christian believer should 
expect to find that biological evolution happens through the effect of secondary causes which can be studied wholly by 
the natural sciences. One might also argue that the problem of natural evil requires assuming that God never intervenes 
in nature – otherwise we could easily ask why God des not intervene more. (On this discussion see espcially Corabi 
2009.) While these arguments are interesting, ultimately I do not think they are strong enough to allow us to rule the 
possibility of supernatural activity in natural history already without considering the empirical evidence. It is not 
impossible for defenders of supernatural design to think of some reason why God might have acted supernatu ally. For 
example, McCullough (2013) argues that miracles in nature serve as a powerful testimony of the existence of a theistic 
(as opposed to deistic) God who takes a personal interest in life. See further Kojonen 2016a, chapters 9-10 & Kojonen 
2016b. 
reject scientism – the belief that science is the only way to gain reliable knowledge – we can accept 
Halvorson´s point that natural science is not trying to discover all sorts of truths. (Stenmark 2001; 
2004)  
 
Suppose that the history of life indeed includes supernatural creation events, and that this cannot 
be discovered through the natural sciences. If we reject scientism, then the inability of the natural 
sciences to talk about the creation event does not mean that such a thing could not be thought 
about outside of the natural sciences. If we respect the idea that there are valid disciplines other 
than the natural sciences, then each question should belong to the domain of the discipline that can 
best study the question, though solving a problem might often require input from several different 
disciplines. On this kind of understanding, the inability of the natural sciences to refer to personal 
explanations is no more problematic than the inability of psychologists to study quantum 
mechanics. It may still be possible to defend belief in the designedness of the cosmos (and also 
even the designedness of biology, according to some) as an argument of natural theology, rather 
than a part of the natural sciences.15 
 
So, on my understanding, there must always be something provisional about this methodological 
naturalism. This is because the proper limits of each discipline (such as chemistry, biology, 
psychology, philosophy, theology and so on) are not revealed infallibly in some holy writ, but 
must be based on our constantly developing understanding of the nature of reality and our 
experience of what methods work in understanding certain kinds of problems. So in this sense I 
would agree with Boudry, Blancke and Braeckman (2010) that methodological naturalism in 
explaining the phenomena of biology, for example, must be based on our experience that natural 
explanations tend to work quite well for biological phenomena. As Uskali Mäki (2013) argues, 
“scientific imperialism” as the intrusion of one discipline into what has traditionally been 
considered the domain of another science can in principle also be a recommendable thing. 
Sometimes, theories from one discipline of study can legitimately shed light on long-standing 
problems in another discipline. The success or failure of such attempts has to be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis. 
                                                          
15 See Wahlberg 2012 for the natural theological argument that perceiving biology as designed is compatible with 
evolutionary biology; see further also Kojonen (forthcoming) for an analysis of this argument strategy. 
 
The advent of evolutionary biology can be regarded as just such an event where a phenomenon 
that was previously widely thought to be the realm of theology (the origin of species) was 
transformed into the domain of the natural sciences. However, (and here I agree again with critics 
of methodological naturalism such as Boudry, Blancke and Braeckman 2010, 240-241) we can in 
principle imagine a world where the origin of life and the origin of species were actually caused by 
a supernatural creation event, no matter how credible or incredible this appears on our world. In 
such a world, I would argue, it might become reasonable to regard the origin of life or the origin of 
species as the proper boundary between theology and the natural sciences, or perhaps the domain 
of some new kind of biological science combining the methods of forensics, archeology and SETI 
(the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence) with the traditional methods of biology. In this case 
methodologically naturalistic science would no longer be the best science for studying the origin of 
life. So, I agree that something like ID could in principle be plausible in some possible world.16 So, 
even though this kind of methodological naturalism allows us to banish ID from the natural 
sciences, this does not mean stopping ID´s arguments from getting a hearing. Nor would it mean 
that religious believers or philosophical naturalists could not use “all they know” to evaluate how 
likely some scientific hypothesis appears to be from the point of view of their worldview.17 
 
Rather, the discussion comes down to how good the arguments for various views are, and in the 
end cannot be settled simply by reference to the traditional boundaries of disciplines (as valuable 
as these are). If we think that biological problems are properly a realm where strong 
methodological naturalism applies, we have to present arguments for why we think this is so, such 
as the appeal to the history of biological research and the success of evolutionary explanations. 
These arguments will have to show why it is likely that we will find naturalistic explanations for 
all biological problems, and why ID's arguments fail to overturn these naturalistic explanations. In 
the end, all depends on evidential considerations like our understanding of what kind of methods 
have previously been successful in solving each kind of problem. Our methodological choices 
                                                          
16 For a similar pragmatic defense of methodological naturalism, see McDonald & Tro (forthcoming). They do not 
consider methodological naturalism in the natural sciences to be a part of the definition of natural science as such, but 
argue that methodological naturalism is adopted in the natural sciences simply because of the past succe s of natural 
explanations. 
17 On how such evaluation could be done without compro ising scientific neutrality regarding religion, see Stenmark 
2004, chapters 8 and 9. For a competing point of view see Ratzsch 2004. 
should reflect our evidence-based understanding of the ontology of the problem. So, approaching 
some problem as an issue best suited to study by methodologically naturalistic natural sciences 
cannot in this defense be a dogmatically held position, but a working assumption and the result of 
the evaluation of our knowledge of that problem. In this conclusion I come close to the result of 
Boudry, Blancke and Braeckman, though I disagree somewhat with their overall motivation and 
model of methodological naturalism.18 
 
The form of methodological naturalism outlined above holds that the natural sciences are by 
convention a search for natural causes. I have argued that this position is not made problematic by 
the truth seeking objection, as long as methodological naturalism is not coupled with scientism, 
where rationality and the possibility for knowledge about the natural world are restricted to the 
natural sciences. Together with scientism, methodological naturalism would indeed be the kind of 
ideological position that ID proponents criticize, because this would mean that the entire 
possibility of design-like explanations would be barred from consideration. In order to be 
defensible against the truth seeking objection, methodologically naturalistic science must in 
principle be able to have boundaries which are evidentially determined. In that case pragmatic 
reasons can lead to the adoption of methodological naturalism in the natural sciences. There is a 
boon here also for ID proponents: if they were to adopt this understanding of methodological 
naturalism, they could well present ID more as a way of challenging the mainstream 
understanding of where the boundaries of different disciplines lie, rather than as a violation of 




                                                          
18 This conclusion also fits with Michael Ruse´s definition of methodological naturalism as a necessary p t of the natural 
sciences by definition. Ruse argues that “even if Sc entific Creationism were totally successful in making its case as 
science, it would not yield a scientific explanation of origins. Rather, at most, it could prove that science shows that there 
can be no scientific explanation of origins.” (Ruse 1982, 322; quoted in Plantinga 1997, 1). Thus Ruse is also not ruling 
out the possibility that creationists might be right a priori, but only based on what his (and the majority´s) estimate of the 
scientific evidence is. If creationists or ID proponents were successful in making their arguments, then it would on the 
aforementioned understanding of methodological naturalism still not be natural science. However, in that case the domain 
of the natural sciences would be smaller than it is currently thought to be. This is not to say that te ID research program 
could not on this understanding also have parts tha can be investigated within methodologically naturlistic science, such 
as the ID proponent´s ideas about the limits of evolutionary processes. (See further Collins 2006). 
In the debate over ID, much energy has been used to debate whether ID can qualify as natural 
science or not. However, once we reject scientism, we should realize that there are also questions 
that are better studied by methods other than those typically used in the natural sciences. For 
example, methods of design detection are important in studying human culture and artifacts. The 
precise boundaries within disciplines are best based on our experience of what kinds of methods 
actually work in increasing understanding in each area. There is no a priori way to determine that 
methods of design detection could not in principle also provide the most understanding in 
problems like the origin of life; there is not even any a priori way to determine that the origin of 
life was not a supernatural miracle. The superiority of methodologically naturalistic science in 
investigating these problems needs to be argued, rather than assumed a priori. Because of this, 
intrinsic methodological naturalism will not ultimately allow us to avoid giving ID a hearing, if 
ID´s arguments are otherwise good. After we take account of the truth seeking objection, 
methodological naturalism of any type should be defended non-dogmatically. Methodological 
naturalism must be, as Robert C. Bishop states, “an approach to scientific investigation that seeks 
to take phenomena on their own terms to understand them as they actually are.” (Bishop 2013, 10) 
If intrinsic methodological naturalism is understood in this way as a provisional and non-dogmatic 
enterprise, the truth seeking objection does not refute it. This does not mean that there might not 
be some other reason for rejecting methodological naturalism as a part of the definition of natural 
science, of course. For example, one might continue to argue that methodological naturalism 
cannot be seen as a necessary part of the definition of natural science as long as the demarcation 
question remains unsettled. The socially accepted definition of natural science has undergone 
considerable development in history, and it could in principle do so again.19  
 
However, once the question of truth is addressed, I would argue that the remaining questions 
about the definition of science are ultimately a side issue for the debate over ID and evolution. I 
agree with Susan Haack (2003) and Ian Hutchinson (2011) that the overt focus on the demarcation 
                                                          
19 I have also not considered the arguments for “theis ic science” at length in this paper. To develop the argument of this 
paper further, the definition of natural science as methodologically naturalistic would also have to be related to the 
discussion over the unity of science, dating back to medieval times. (On this see Cat 2014.) At some point we will 
probably want to integrate the results of the different sciences into a broader view of the world. Plantinga’s theistic 
science as a rival to methodological naturalism is one method for attempting such an integration. (See Ratzsch 2004). 
Defenders of methodological naturalism will likely want to adopt a different method of integration, e.g. Russell’s 
(2008) model of mutual creative interaction between different disciplines. See further also Stenmark 2004, chapters 8 
and 9. 
question in our intellectual culture reflects the cultural influence of scientism. Science has 
enormous cultural authority, and this makes it appealing for proponents of ID to attempt to claim 
the label “science” for their ideas, and for opponents of ID to argue that ID is merely 
pseudoscience.20 But in the long term, it would perhaps be prudent to question the undervaluing 
of non-scientific ideas in Western culture. If the problematic nature of scientism became more 
widely known, perhaps proponents and critics of ID would feel less pressure to argue about the 
definition of science, and could instead concentrate on more interesting questions, such as the 
evaluation of the arguments themselves. Methodological naturalism should also not be understood 
on a ban on discussing the theological and philosophical reasons that influence beliefs about 
origins. The quality of our arguments, the reliability of our conclusions and our ability to reason 
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